Steup, Matthias.
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. - 1 online resource (400 pages) - New York Academy of Sciences Ser. . - New York Academy of Sciences Ser. .
Intro -- Contemporary Debates in Epistemology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- Preface to the Second Edition -- Preface to the First Edition -- 1 Should Knowledge Come First? -- Knowledge First -- Note -- What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology? -- (Un)analyzability -- Justification and Excuses -- The Good and Bad Cases -- Regarding Indiscriminability -- Regarding Formal Methods -- Notes -- References -- Experience First -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Knowledge Still First -- Still Nowhere Else to Start -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 2 Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment? -- The Case against Closure -- 1 Transmissibility -- 2 Closure -- 3 Heavyweight Implications -- Notes -- References -- The Case for Closure -- Introduction -- 1 Versions of Epistemic Closure -- 2 In Favor of Closure Principle (4) -- Argument (A): closure and distribution -- Argument (B): knowledge and assertion -- 3 Heavyweight Propositions and Conclusive Reasons -- Category 1: manifestly heavyweight with conclusive reasons -- Category 2: not manifestly heavyweight but lacking conclusive reasons -- 4 Residual Puzzles -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Hawthorne -- 3 Is Knowledge Contextual? -- Contextualism Contested -- Epistemic Contexualism -- Loose Talk -- Strict Truth -- A Delicate Balance -- Notes -- References -- Contextualism Defended -- 1 Contextualism and Skeptical Paradoxes -- 2 Alternative Accounts -- 3 Is the Contextualist Model Coherent? -- Note -- References -- Contextualism Contested Some More -- Brief Replies -- Notes -- Contextualism Defended Some More -- 1 When Should We Appeal to Contextualist Resolutions of Philosophical Paradoxes? -- 2 Explaining the Skeptical Paradox: Contextualism versus Invariantism -- 3 Objections to Contextualism -- Notes -- References -- 4 Do Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know?. Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know -- Notes -- References -- Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know -- 1 The Case for Pragmatic Encroachment -- 1a Practical talk about knowledge -- 1b Knowledge as a safe reason -- 1c High stakes and low stakes -- 2 Objections to Pragmatic Encroachment -- 2a The variety of ways we criticize, justify, and excuse -- 2b Crazy counterfactuals -- 2c Knowledge and high stakes -- 2d The relativity of knowledge -- 2e Safe reasons and the risk of error -- 2f The Dutch book -- 2g Putting the cart before the horse -- 3 An Alternative Proposal -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- 5 Can Skepticism Be Refuted? -- The Refutation of Skepticism -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism -- Defining the Skeptical Challenge -- Underdetermination -- Choosing from among Competitors -- The Analysis of Epistemic Probability -- Another Sort of Domestic Skepticism -- Reasoning to the Best Explanation -- Notes -- References -- 6 Are Intellectually Virtuous Motives Essential to Knowledge? -- Knowledge Need Not Be Virtuously Motivated -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- Notes -- References -- Knowledge and the Motive for Truth -- 1 The Motive for Truth in Our Epistemic Lives -- 2 What Is Special about Knowledge? -- 3 Knowledge as a State Acquired by a Conscientious Agent -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Zagzebski -- I -- II -- III -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Baehr -- 7 Can Knowledge Be Lucky? -- Knowledge Cannot Be Lucky -- 1 Knowledge and Luck -- 2 Unpacking the Anti-Luck Condition I: Sensitivity -- 3 Unpacking the Anti-Luck Condition II: Safety -- 4 Three Putative Counterexamples -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Knowledge Can Be Lucky -- 1 Safety's Modal Nature -- 2 Safety-Advocacy's Modal Failing. 3 Safety-Advocacy's Dilemma -- 4 Diagnosis of the Dilemma's Applicability -- 5 Knowledge Fallibilism versus Knowledge Infallibilism -- 6 Anti-Luck -- 7 Pritchard's Form of Analysis -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- 8 Is There a Priori Knowledge? -- In Defense of the a Priori -- The Nature of a Priori Reasons -- The Argument from Examples for the Existence of a Priori Reasons -- Dialectical Arguments for the Existence of a Priori Reasons -- A Priori Reasons without a Priori Insight: Moderate Empiricism -- The Rejection of a Priori Reasons: Radical Empiricism -- Notes -- References -- There Is No a Priori -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Motivation -- 3 Obscurity -- 4 BonJour's Rationalism -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Devitt -- Reply to BonJour -- References -- Last Rejoinder -- Notes -- Reference -- Further Reading -- 9 Is There Immediate Justification? -- There Is Immediate Justification -- 1 Justification -- 2 Immediate Justification -- 3 Why Believe in Immediate Justification? -- 4 The Master Argument for Coherentism -- 5 Avoiding Arbitrariness -- 6 Evidence and Reasons -- 7 Grounding and Being Guided by Norms -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- There Is No Immediate Justification -- Introduction -- Where Does Immediate Justification Come From? -- The Problem -- The Neo-Rationalist Gambit and Immediate Justification -- Grounding -- Options -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Comesa�na -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Pryor -- Notes -- References -- 10 Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone? -- Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability -- References -- Further Reading -- Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Van Cleve -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References. Reply to Elgin -- Notes -- References -- 11 Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? -- Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem -- The Regress Problem -- Step 1: Neither Foundationalism nor Coherentism Can Solve the Regress Problem -- Step 2: Infinitism -- Step 3: Replies to the Best Objections to Infinitism -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- Infinitism Is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem -- Examples of Non-inferential Justification -- A priori -- A posteriori -- Objections to These Examples -- Two Problems for Infinitism -- First problem -- Second problem -- References -- Reply to Ginet -- Areas of Agreement between the Infinitist and the Finitist -- An Area of Potential Agreement -- Areas of Disagreement -- Basic Difference: Reasoning Can Originate Warrant -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Klein -- 1 Fred and Doris -- Inferentialism Drives Out Infinitism? -- 12 Can Evidence Be Permissive? -- Evidence Can Be Permissive -- 1 The Strength of Uniqueness -- 2 A Jamesian argument for Permissivism -- 3 Interpersonal versus Intrapersonal Slack -- 4 Evidential Support -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Further Reading -- Evidence Cannot Be Permissive -- 1 Permissivism and Disagreement -- 2 The Case against Permissivism -- 2.1 Evidential support -- 2.2 Arbitrariness -- 2.3 Reflection argument -- 2.4 Arbitrary switching -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- 13 Is Justification Internal? -- Justification Is Not Internal -- 1 The Internalism-Externalism Debate in Epistemology -- 2 Three Motivations for Internalism -- 2.1 Epistemic justification as epistemic responsibility -- 2.2 Like believers have like justification -- 2.3 Replying to skepticism -- 3 The General Argument against Internalism -- 4 Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Justification Is Internal -- I Background. A The traditional analysis of knowledge -- B Rival accounts of knowledge -- C A crucial difference between good reasons analyses and causal analyses -- II Clarifications -- A Knowledge and justification -- B Justification and well-foundedness -- C The Gettier problem -- D Deontology -- III Internalism Vindicated -- A Some internalist epistemic evaluations -- B Knowledge without reasons -- C Knowledge with reasons -- D Externalist accounts of good reasons -- E Forgotten evidence examples -- IV Conclusion -- References -- 14 Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? -- Truth Is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal -- What Is Epistemology? -- Epistemic Values and Goals -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis -- I Possessing Truth -- II Truth Goals -- III Epistemic Goals -- IV The True-belief Goal and the Justified-belief Goal -- V The True-belief Goal and the Knowledge Goal -- VI Problems -- References -- Further reading -- Index.
9781118328149
Electronic books.
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. - 1 online resource (400 pages) - New York Academy of Sciences Ser. . - New York Academy of Sciences Ser. .
Intro -- Contemporary Debates in Epistemology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- Preface to the Second Edition -- Preface to the First Edition -- 1 Should Knowledge Come First? -- Knowledge First -- Note -- What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology? -- (Un)analyzability -- Justification and Excuses -- The Good and Bad Cases -- Regarding Indiscriminability -- Regarding Formal Methods -- Notes -- References -- Experience First -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Knowledge Still First -- Still Nowhere Else to Start -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 2 Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment? -- The Case against Closure -- 1 Transmissibility -- 2 Closure -- 3 Heavyweight Implications -- Notes -- References -- The Case for Closure -- Introduction -- 1 Versions of Epistemic Closure -- 2 In Favor of Closure Principle (4) -- Argument (A): closure and distribution -- Argument (B): knowledge and assertion -- 3 Heavyweight Propositions and Conclusive Reasons -- Category 1: manifestly heavyweight with conclusive reasons -- Category 2: not manifestly heavyweight but lacking conclusive reasons -- 4 Residual Puzzles -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Hawthorne -- 3 Is Knowledge Contextual? -- Contextualism Contested -- Epistemic Contexualism -- Loose Talk -- Strict Truth -- A Delicate Balance -- Notes -- References -- Contextualism Defended -- 1 Contextualism and Skeptical Paradoxes -- 2 Alternative Accounts -- 3 Is the Contextualist Model Coherent? -- Note -- References -- Contextualism Contested Some More -- Brief Replies -- Notes -- Contextualism Defended Some More -- 1 When Should We Appeal to Contextualist Resolutions of Philosophical Paradoxes? -- 2 Explaining the Skeptical Paradox: Contextualism versus Invariantism -- 3 Objections to Contextualism -- Notes -- References -- 4 Do Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know?. Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know -- Notes -- References -- Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know -- 1 The Case for Pragmatic Encroachment -- 1a Practical talk about knowledge -- 1b Knowledge as a safe reason -- 1c High stakes and low stakes -- 2 Objections to Pragmatic Encroachment -- 2a The variety of ways we criticize, justify, and excuse -- 2b Crazy counterfactuals -- 2c Knowledge and high stakes -- 2d The relativity of knowledge -- 2e Safe reasons and the risk of error -- 2f The Dutch book -- 2g Putting the cart before the horse -- 3 An Alternative Proposal -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- 5 Can Skepticism Be Refuted? -- The Refutation of Skepticism -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism -- Defining the Skeptical Challenge -- Underdetermination -- Choosing from among Competitors -- The Analysis of Epistemic Probability -- Another Sort of Domestic Skepticism -- Reasoning to the Best Explanation -- Notes -- References -- 6 Are Intellectually Virtuous Motives Essential to Knowledge? -- Knowledge Need Not Be Virtuously Motivated -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- Notes -- References -- Knowledge and the Motive for Truth -- 1 The Motive for Truth in Our Epistemic Lives -- 2 What Is Special about Knowledge? -- 3 Knowledge as a State Acquired by a Conscientious Agent -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Zagzebski -- I -- II -- III -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Baehr -- 7 Can Knowledge Be Lucky? -- Knowledge Cannot Be Lucky -- 1 Knowledge and Luck -- 2 Unpacking the Anti-Luck Condition I: Sensitivity -- 3 Unpacking the Anti-Luck Condition II: Safety -- 4 Three Putative Counterexamples -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Knowledge Can Be Lucky -- 1 Safety's Modal Nature -- 2 Safety-Advocacy's Modal Failing. 3 Safety-Advocacy's Dilemma -- 4 Diagnosis of the Dilemma's Applicability -- 5 Knowledge Fallibilism versus Knowledge Infallibilism -- 6 Anti-Luck -- 7 Pritchard's Form of Analysis -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- 8 Is There a Priori Knowledge? -- In Defense of the a Priori -- The Nature of a Priori Reasons -- The Argument from Examples for the Existence of a Priori Reasons -- Dialectical Arguments for the Existence of a Priori Reasons -- A Priori Reasons without a Priori Insight: Moderate Empiricism -- The Rejection of a Priori Reasons: Radical Empiricism -- Notes -- References -- There Is No a Priori -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Motivation -- 3 Obscurity -- 4 BonJour's Rationalism -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Devitt -- Reply to BonJour -- References -- Last Rejoinder -- Notes -- Reference -- Further Reading -- 9 Is There Immediate Justification? -- There Is Immediate Justification -- 1 Justification -- 2 Immediate Justification -- 3 Why Believe in Immediate Justification? -- 4 The Master Argument for Coherentism -- 5 Avoiding Arbitrariness -- 6 Evidence and Reasons -- 7 Grounding and Being Guided by Norms -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- There Is No Immediate Justification -- Introduction -- Where Does Immediate Justification Come From? -- The Problem -- The Neo-Rationalist Gambit and Immediate Justification -- Grounding -- Options -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Comesa�na -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Pryor -- Notes -- References -- 10 Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone? -- Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability -- References -- Further Reading -- Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Van Cleve -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References. Reply to Elgin -- Notes -- References -- 11 Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? -- Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem -- The Regress Problem -- Step 1: Neither Foundationalism nor Coherentism Can Solve the Regress Problem -- Step 2: Infinitism -- Step 3: Replies to the Best Objections to Infinitism -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- Infinitism Is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem -- Examples of Non-inferential Justification -- A priori -- A posteriori -- Objections to These Examples -- Two Problems for Infinitism -- First problem -- Second problem -- References -- Reply to Ginet -- Areas of Agreement between the Infinitist and the Finitist -- An Area of Potential Agreement -- Areas of Disagreement -- Basic Difference: Reasoning Can Originate Warrant -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Reply to Klein -- 1 Fred and Doris -- Inferentialism Drives Out Infinitism? -- 12 Can Evidence Be Permissive? -- Evidence Can Be Permissive -- 1 The Strength of Uniqueness -- 2 A Jamesian argument for Permissivism -- 3 Interpersonal versus Intrapersonal Slack -- 4 Evidential Support -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Further Reading -- Evidence Cannot Be Permissive -- 1 Permissivism and Disagreement -- 2 The Case against Permissivism -- 2.1 Evidential support -- 2.2 Arbitrariness -- 2.3 Reflection argument -- 2.4 Arbitrary switching -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- 13 Is Justification Internal? -- Justification Is Not Internal -- 1 The Internalism-Externalism Debate in Epistemology -- 2 Three Motivations for Internalism -- 2.1 Epistemic justification as epistemic responsibility -- 2.2 Like believers have like justification -- 2.3 Replying to skepticism -- 3 The General Argument against Internalism -- 4 Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Justification Is Internal -- I Background. A The traditional analysis of knowledge -- B Rival accounts of knowledge -- C A crucial difference between good reasons analyses and causal analyses -- II Clarifications -- A Knowledge and justification -- B Justification and well-foundedness -- C The Gettier problem -- D Deontology -- III Internalism Vindicated -- A Some internalist epistemic evaluations -- B Knowledge without reasons -- C Knowledge with reasons -- D Externalist accounts of good reasons -- E Forgotten evidence examples -- IV Conclusion -- References -- 14 Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? -- Truth Is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal -- What Is Epistemology? -- Epistemic Values and Goals -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis -- I Possessing Truth -- II Truth Goals -- III Epistemic Goals -- IV The True-belief Goal and the Justified-belief Goal -- V The True-belief Goal and the Knowledge Goal -- VI Problems -- References -- Further reading -- Index.
9781118328149
Electronic books.