Crowe, Christopher.
Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate / [electronic resource] : prepared by Christopher Crowe. - [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2006. - 41 p. - IMF working paper ; WP/06/256 . - IMF working paper ; WP/06/256. .
"November 2006."
Includes bibliographical references.
Electronic reproduction.
Palo Alto, Calif. :
ebrary,
2011.
Available via World Wide Web.
Access may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries.
Banks and banking, Central.
Monetary policy.
Electronic books.
HG1811 / .C76 2006eb
Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate / [electronic resource] : prepared by Christopher Crowe. - [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2006. - 41 p. - IMF working paper ; WP/06/256 . - IMF working paper ; WP/06/256. .
"November 2006."
Includes bibliographical references.
Electronic reproduction.
Palo Alto, Calif. :
ebrary,
2011.
Available via World Wide Web.
Access may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries.
Banks and banking, Central.
Monetary policy.
Electronic books.
HG1811 / .C76 2006eb