IUKL Library

Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology : (Record no. 324906)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 11166nam a22005173i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field EBC6722062
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field MiAaPQ
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240322152737.0
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field cr cnu||||||||
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 231028s2021 xx o ||||0 eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9789402420869
Qualifying information (electronic bk.)
Cancelled/invalid ISBN 9789402420852
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (MiAaPQ)EBC6722062
System control number (Au-PeEL)EBL6722062
System control number (OCoLC)1268472090
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MiAaPQ
Language of cataloging eng
Description conventions rda
-- pn
Transcribing agency MiAaPQ
Modifying agency MiAaPQ
050 #4 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number TP248.13-248.65
082 0# - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 358.38
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Trump, Benjamin D.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology :
Remainder of title Addressing Security and Resilience Issues.
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement 1st ed.
264 #1 -
-- Dordrecht :
-- Springer Netherlands,
-- 2021.
-- �2021.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 1 online resource (233 pages)
336 ## -
-- text
-- txt
-- rdacontent
337 ## -
-- computer
-- c
-- rdamedia
338 ## -
-- online resource
-- cr
-- rdacarrier
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security Series
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note Intro -- Disclaimer -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- About the Editors -- Chapter 1: Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance -- 1.1 An Introduction to the Dual-Use Nature of Emerging Biotechnology -- 1.2 History -- 1.3 Effective Governance and Policy for Biosecurity -- 1.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 2: Emerging Biosecurity Threats and Responses: A Review of Published and Gray Literature -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Methods -- 2.3 Results and Discussion -- 2.3.1 US and EU Governmental Frameworks -- 2.3.1.1 US Framework -- 2.3.1.2 EU Framework -- 2.3.2 Threats Identified in the Literature -- 2.3.3 Responses Identified in the Literature -- 2.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Opportunities, Challenges, and Future Considerations for Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Understanding the Scope and Limitations of Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology -- 3.2.1 International Instruments for Biosecurity -- 3.2.1.1 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) -- 3.2.1.2 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- 3.2.1.3 Australia Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and Others -- 3.2.2 National Implementation -- 3.2.2.1 Hard Law vs. Soft Law -- 3.2.2.2 Biosafety vs. Biosecurity, GMOs vs. Synthetic Biology -- 3.2.2.3 National Implementation: An Inevitable Patchwork -- 3.3 Key Novelties and Tensions Introduced by Synthetic Biology -- 3.3.1 Convergence -- 3.3.2 Democratization -- 3.3.3 Intangibility -- 3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations -- References -- Chapter 4: Biological Standards and Biosecurity: The Unexplored Link -- 4.1 Standards in Biology -- 4.2 Implications of Standards in Biosecurity in Terms of Risks -- 4.3 Universality -- 4.4 Chassis and Trojan Horses -- 4.5 Breaking Down the Species Barrier.
Formatted contents note 4.6 Standards as Social Constructs -- 4.7 Final Remarks and Open Questions -- References -- Chapter 5: Responsible Governance of Biosecurity in Armenia -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Capacity Building in Dual Use Export Control in TI Partner Countries -- 5.3 Legal Framework Governing Dual Use Life Sciences and Biosecurity -- 5.3.1 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare - Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 -- 5.3.2 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction -- 5.3.3 United Nation Security Council Resolution No. 1540 (UNSCR 1540) -- 5.3.4 National Laws and Law Enforcement -- 5.4 Ethics of Dual Use Life Sciences -- 5.5 Case Study Life Sciences and Biosecurity in Armenia -- 5.6 Dual Use Life Sciences in Armenia -- 5.7 Discussing Ethical Dilemmas -- 5.8 Conclusions and Recommendations -- References -- Chapter 6: Addressing Emerging Synthetic Biology Threats: The Role of Education and Outreach in Fostering Effective Bottom-Up Grassroots Governance -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Structure of the Synthetic Biology Community -- 6.3 Perceptions of Risks Within the Synthetic Biology Community -- 6.4 Enhancing Stakeholder Interaction in the Field of Biosafety and Biosecurity -- 6.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 7: Cyberbiosecurity and Public Health in the Age of COVID-19 -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Privacy of Contact Tracing Data -- 7.3 Protecting Public Health and Disease Surveillance Data -- 7.4 Integrity and Validation of Self-Administered Testing -- 7.5 Integrity of Public Bioinformatic Databases -- 7.6 Defending Against Cyberattacks on Laboratory Devices -- 7.7 Protection of Intellectual Property -- 7.8 Discussion.
Formatted contents note Chapter 8: Synthetic Biology Brings New Challenges to Managing Biosecurity and Biosafety -- 8.1 Resilience as a Complimentary Philosophical Framework to Managing Potential Biohazards -- 8.2 COVID-19 Pandemic as a Call to Action for Resilience in Biosafety and Biosecurity -- 8.3 A Domain-Based Resilience Framework to Adapt to Biosecurity and Biosafety -- 8.3.1 Physical Domain -- 8.3.2 Information Domain -- 8.3.3 Cognitive Domain -- 8.3.4 Social Domain -- 8.4 Discussion -- References -- Chapter 9: Emerging Biotechnology and Information Hazards -- 9.1 What Is an Information Hazard? -- 9.2 When Do Information Hazards Matter? -- 9.3 How Might Information Hazards Be Governed? -- 9.4 Information Hazards: Where Do We Go from Here? -- References -- Chapter 10: Technical Aspects of Biosecurity: Screening Guidance, Attribution, and Traceability -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Current Technology -- 10.2.1 DNA Sequence Screening -- 10.2.1.1 State-of-the-Art -- 10.2.1.2 Next-Generation Tool Development -- 10.2.2 Attribution and Traceability -- 10.2.3 Gaps in Existing Biosecurity Technology Framework -- 10.3 Imminent Opportunities for Technology Development -- 10.3.1 Biological Threat Prevention -- 10.3.1.1 Design -- Specification -- Design Tools -- Selecting Chassis -- Tools to Enhance Tracking of Users and Research -- 10.3.1.2 Build -- Who Should Be Screening Synthesis Production in the Future? -- A Stratified White List Approach for DNA Synthesis Production -- Functional Equivalence of Sequences -- DNA Assembly and Smaller DNA Synthesis Providers -- Attribution and Tracing -- 10.3.1.3 Test -- Physical Containment -- Biology-Based Containment -- Horizontal Gene Transfer -- 10.3.1.4 Economic Drivers -- 10.3.2 Detection of Biological Threats -- 10.3.2.1 Diagnostics -- 10.3.2.2 Surveillance -- 10.3.3 Threat Response and Countermeasures.
Formatted contents note 10.4 Long-Term Opportunities for Technology Development -- 10.4.1 Implications for Adaptive Risk Management Framework -- 10.4.2 Imagining the Far Future -- Chapter 11: The Soil Habitat and Considerations for Synthetic Biology -- 11.1 The Soil System -- 11.1.1 Soil Properties -- 11.1.2 Life in Soil -- 11.2 Fitness of Genetically-Altered Organisms -- 11.2.1 Fitness of Domesticated Microorganisms -- 11.3 Considerations for Survival in Soil -- 11.3.1 Soil Conditions Influence Growth -- 11.3.2 Microbial Adaptations -- 11.3.3 Fitness of Microorganisms in Soil -- 11.4 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 12: Foresight in Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology Threats -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.1.1 Foresight Terminology -- 12.1.2 Examples of Foresight for Biological Threats -- 12.2 Foresight Methods -- 12.2.1 General Approach -- 12.2.2 Delphi Method -- 12.2.2.1 Strengths -- 12.2.2.2 Limitations -- 12.2.3 Horizon Scanning -- 12.2.3.1 Strengths -- 12.2.3.2 Limitations -- 12.2.4 Scenario Analysis -- 12.2.4.1 Strengths -- 12.2.4.2 Limitations -- 12.3 Foresight Questions -- 12.3.1 Approach to Choosing Questions -- 12.3.2 Questions for Synthetic Biology Threats -- 12.4 Recommendations -- 12.4.1 Foresight Process Design -- 12.4.2 Synthetic Biology Considerations -- 12.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 13: Predicting Biosecurity Threats: Deployment and Detection of Biological Weapons -- 13.1 Methods of Deployment -- 13.2 Targets -- 13.2.1 Humans -- 13.2.2 Agriculture -- 13.2.3 Technology -- 13.2.4 The Environment -- 13.3 Screening Techniques -- 13.3.1 Pre-deployment: Gene Synthesis -- 13.3.2 Post-deployment: Pathogen Detection -- 13.4 Conclusion -- Literature Cited -- Chapter 14: Promoting Effective Biosecurity Governance: Using Tripwires to Anticipate and Ameliorate Potentially Harmful Development Trends -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Biological Weapons in History.
Formatted contents note 14.3 Promoting Responsible Research in Modern Biotechnology: Tripwires as a Framework to Understand Red-Team Capacity and Intent for Nefarious Deployment of Technology -- 14.3.1 Regime Characteristics that Could Lead to Synthetic Biology Weapons Development and Their Tripwires -- 14.3.1.1 Stage 1a. Bottom-Up Initiative: Independent Actors Indicate Interest in Synthetic Biology -- 14.3.1.2 Stage 1b. Top-Down Initiative: Regime Indicates Interest in Synthetic Biology -- 14.3.1.3 Stage 2. Achievement of Scientific, Technological, and Engineering Capacity for Synthetic Biology -- 14.3.1.4 Stage 3a. Active Development of Synthetic Biology Weapons -- 14.3.1.5 Stage 3b. Acquisition of Synthetic Biology Weapons from an External Source -- 14.3.1.6 Stage 4. Deployment of Synthetic Biology Weapons -- 14.3.2 Key Enabling Technologies and Technological Tripwires -- 14.4 Conclusion -- References.
588 ## -
-- Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2023. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
655 #4 - INDEX TERM--GENRE/FORM
Genre/form data or focus term Electronic books.
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Florin, Marie-Valentine.
Personal name Perkins, Edward.
Personal name Linkov, Igor.
776 08 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Display text Print version:
Main entry heading Trump, Benjamin D.
Title Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology
Place, publisher, and date of publication Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands,c2021
International Standard Book Number 9789402420852
797 2# - LOCAL ADDED ENTRY--CORPORATE NAME (RLIN)
Corporate name or jurisdiction name as entry element ProQuest (Firm)
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security Series
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kliuc-ebooks/detail.action?docID=6722062
Public note Click to View
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme
Koha item type E-book
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Collection code Permanent Location Current Location Date acquired Source of acquisition Date last seen Copy number Price effective from Koha item type
            IUKL Library IUKL Library 2024-03-22 Access Dunia 2024-03-22 1 2024-03-22 E-book
The Library's homepage is at http://library.iukl.edu.my/.