Intro -- Epistemology: A Guide -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1 The best case for skepticism about the external world? (Stroud, "The Problem of the External World") -- References -- 2 Proving the external world exists (Or: Let's all give Moore a hand!) (Moore, "Proof of an External World") -- 3 Some ways of resisting skepticism (Moore, "Four Forms of Scepticism") -- 4 Plausibility and possibilities (Moore, "Certainty") -- 5 Skeptic on skeptic (Klein, "How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism") -- 6 Realism in epistemology (Williams, "Epistemological Realism") -- 7 Socratic questions and the foundation of empirical knowledge (Chisholm, "The Myth of the Given") -- 8-9 The foundation of empirical knowledge? (Sellars, "Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?" and "Epistemic Principles") -- Reference -- 10 It's not a given that empirical knowledge has a foundation (BonJour, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?") -- 11 Interpretation, meaning and skepticism (Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge") -- Reference -- 12 Blending foundationalism and coherentism (Haack, "A Foundherentist Theory of Epistemic Justification") -- 13 Foundationalism, coherentism and supervenience (Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid") -- References -- 14 Infinitism (Klein, "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons") -- 15 The Gettier problem (Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?") -- References -- 16 Some principles concerning knowledge and inference (Harman, Thought, Selections) -- Reference -- 17 The essence of the Gettier problem (Zagzebski, "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems") -- 18 Knowledge is an unanalyzable mental state (Williamson, "A State of Mind") -- References -- 19 Closure, contrast and semi-skepticism (Dretske, "Epistemic Operators").

Reference -- 20 Closure, contrast and anti-skepticism (Stine, "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure") -- 21 Keeping close track of knowledge (Nozick, "Knowledge and Skepticism") -- Reference -- 22 Moore wins (Sosa, "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore") -- 23 The closure principle: dangers and defense (Vogel, "Are There Counter examples to the Closure Principle?") -- Reference -- 24 Evidentialist epistemology (Feldman and Conee, "Evidentialism") -- Reference -- 25 Non-defensive epistemology (Foley, "Skepticism and Rationality") -- 26 Reliabilism about justification (Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?") -- 27 Reliabilism: a level assessment (Vogel, "Reliabilism Leveled") -- 28 Against externalism (BonJour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge") -- 29 Against internalism (Goldman, "Internalism Exposed") -- 30 A skeptical take on externalism (Fumerton, "Externalism and Skepticism") -- 31 A friendly take on internalism (Feldman and Conee, "Internalism Defended") -- 32 Warrant (Plantinga, "Warrant: A First Approximation") -- Reference -- 33 Intellectual virtues (Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind) -- 34 Virtue epistemology (Greco, "Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology") -- 35 Knowledge, luck and virtue (Pritchard, "Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues") -- References -- 36 Epistemic value and cognitive achievement (Sosa, "The Place of Truth in Epistemology") -- 37 Giving up on knowledge (Kvanvig, "Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?") -- Reference -- 38 Giving up on (exact) truth (Elgin, "True Enough") -- 39 Naturalized epistemology advertised (Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized") -- References -- 40 Naturalized epistemology criticized (Kim, "What is 'Naturalized Epistemology'?") -- 41 Naturalized epistemology radicalized (Antony, "Quine as Feminist").

42 A apriori justification and unrevisability (Putnam, "There is at Least One A Priori Truth") -- 43 A priori justification and revisability (Casullo, "Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge") -- 44 Philosophical method and empirical science (Bealer, "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy") -- 45 Experimental epistemology (Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions") -- 46 Natural kinds, intuitions and method in epistemology (Kornblith, "Investigating Knowledge Itself") -- Reference -- 47 Contextualism and skeptical puzzles (DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem") -- 48 Contextualism and infallibilist intuitions (Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge") -- 49 Contextualism and intuitional instability (Cohen, "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems") -- 50 Knowledge and action (Stanley, "Knowledge and Practical Interests, Selections") -- Reference -- 51 Rationality and action (Fantl and McGrath, "Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification") -- 52 One invariantist's scorecard (Hawthorne, "Sensitive Moderate Invariantism") -- Reference -- 53 A relativist theory of knowledge attributions (MacFarlane, "The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions") -- 54 Rationality and trust (Baker, "Trust and Rationality") -- 55 Testimony and gullibility (Fricker, "Against Gullibility") -- 56 Some reflections on how epistemic sources work (Burge, "Content Preservation") -- 57 Testimony and knowledge (Lackey, "Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission") -- Reference -- 58 Memory and knowledge (Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge") -- 59 Perception and knowledge (McDowell, "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge") -- 60 Skills and knowledge (Reynolds, "Knowing How to Believe with Justification") -- Index.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2022. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.