Cover -- Praise for Zero-Sum Victory -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Dedication -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Glossary of Key Actors -- Introduction -- What Is War Termination? -- Gaps in War Termination Scholarship for US Interventions -- Getting War and War Termination Wrong -- How This Study Began -- Methodology -- A Note on Sources -- Structure of the Book -- The Past as Prologue The Vietnam War -- Part I Toward a War Termination Framework -- 1 Further Defining War Termination Three Successful War Termination Outcomes in Irregular War -- Strategy and War Termination -- How Do Outcomes Fit into Strategy? -- 2 The Decisive Victory Paradigm Undermines Strategy for Irregular War -- How Realistic Is Decisive Victory Against Insurgencies? -- Applying War Termination Concept to Cases -- Part II The Pursuit of Decisive Victory in Afghanistan -- 3 Light Footprints to a Long War -- Overview -- Reluctant to Get Too Involved -- One of Many Fronts -- An Unrealistic Approach -- 4 Plans Hit Reality A Recent History of Bad Neighbors and Worse Governance -- The Durand Line and Tensions with Pakistan -- The Soviet-Afghan War -- The Afghan Civil War -- Enter the Taliban -- Misreading a Complex Situation -- 5 The Fall of the Taliban and the Bonn Conference -- A Technocratic Approach -- Facts on the Ground -- The Warlords Are Back -- Consolidating Power in Kabul -- Gathering Storm -- 6 America's Bureaucratic Way of War -- Institutionalizing Silos: The Lead Nation Concept -- Setting the Stage for Taliban Resurgence -- Conclusion to Part II -- Part III Persisting in a Failing Approach -- 7 Accelerating Success, 2003-2007 -- 8 Failing to Keep Pace with the Insurgency, 2007-2009 -- 9 The Good War Going Badly -- 10 Surging into the Good War -- 11 More Shovels in the Quicksand -- 12 Misapplying the Iraq Formula -- 13 Assessments and Risks.

Conclusion to Part III -- Overview -- Part IV Ending the War in Afghanistan -- 14 Reconciliation versus Transition -- 15 Reconciling Reconciliation -- 16 Competing Visions Karzai, Taliban, and Pakistan -- 17 Exploratory Talks Building and Damaging Confidence -- 18 Coming Off the Rails -- 19 Fallout BSA, Bergdahl, and the 2014 Elections -- Conclusion to Part IV -- Overview -- Part V Pursuit of Decisive Victory in Iraq -- Overview -- What Went Wrong? -- 20 Operation Iraqi Freedom Plans without a Strategy -- 21 A Complicated Approach to a Complex Situation -- 22 From Decisive Victory to Transition -- Conclusion to Part V -- Part VI Staying the Course in Iraq -- 23 Achieving Milestones While Losing the War -- 24 Trapped by Partners in a Losing Strategy -- 25 Mirror Imaging Civil-Military Relations -- 26 To Surge or Not to Surge A Possible Win Beats a Certain Loss -- 27 A New Plan on Shaky Foundations -- Conclusion to Part VI -- Overview -- Part VII Ending the War in Iraq -- Overview -- 28 The Surge Misunderstood -- 29 The Absence of a Political Strategy Erodes US Leverage -- 30 New Administration, Similar Challenges -- Conclusion to Part VII -- Part VIII Implications -- 31 Iraq and Afghanistan Compared -- 32 Implications for US Foreign Policy -- 33 Implications for Scholarship -- Implications for Strategy and Counterinsurgency -- Understanding and Addressing Political, Bureaucratic, and Patron-Client Frictions -- Wartime Negotiations and Strategic Bargaining -- Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary War -- Abbreviations -- Key Events in the Afghanistan Conflict -- Key Events in the Iraq Conflict -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2022. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.